Abstract: This paper studies cross-border intellectual property rights (IPR) as a North-South contract using a Nash bargaining approach and distinguishes between the outcome and its actual enforcement. The absorptive capacity of the Southern country to exploit technology transfer plays a key role in the negotiated level of IPRs and its post-treaty enforcement. The optimal level of IPR protection relates positively to absorptive capacity. This provides a rationale for the longer time-frame provided to least developed countries in Article 66 of TRIPS to implement its provisions. In addition, monitoring is only effective in preventing contract violation up to a critical level of absorptive capacity. We relate this to the US Trade Representative "Special 301" report, which flags countries that deny adequate IPR protection as "priority watch list". While disputes with less developed economies are promptly resolved, emerging economies, where most losses from copyright piracy originates from, continue to remain on the list.
This paper is motivated by the important policy issue that concerns an optimal level of cross-border IPR protection agreed to by means of a contract, and its actual enforcement in the South. The paper particularly attempts to differentiate between the pre-and the post-contract periods, and between countries in the South with respect to their absorptive capacity. This sheds light on two unexplored aspects of IPR protection often neglected in the literature: (i) the optimal level of IPR protection obtained through a contract, (ii) the implementation of the agreed level of IPR standards and its relation to the level of development in the South.
Economic literature on IPRs has so far mostly focused on trade and intellectual property (IP) protection in the pre-agreement phase of TRIPS, treating the signing of the treaty as equivalent to the enforcement of IPRs.
1 Evidence, however, shows that in some regions the level of actual IPR enforcement does not coincide with their commitments outlined in TRIPS. Little work exists to our knowledge that investigate the actual post-TRIPS enforcement of IPRs. For example, Javorcik (2004) presents evidence on the effect of IPRs and their actual enforcement on the composition of foreign direct investment in transition countries. Chiang (2004) shows that the efficacy of trade sanctions for alleged IPR cross-border violation is limited to countries that manufacture and export large values of potentially infringing goods. Thorpe (2008) undertakes an analysis to study the implementation of TRIPS in developing countries.
On the theory side, Banerjee (2011) discusses monitoring as a successful enforcement strategy to fight against piracy as long as the costs involved are not too high. Some recent works have introduced the heterogeneity of southern countries with respect to their absorptive capacity when studying the optimal IPR policy. Kim and Lapan (2008) show that more efficient southern countries prefer higher collective IPR protection than less efficient ones. Ghosh and Ishikawa (2011) show the effect of endogenous investments in absorptive capacity on the export/FDI decision of the northern firm and IPRs in the South. To our knowledge, the bargaining aspect of a mutually agreed IPR protection level determined endogenously through a North-South contract has only been discussed in Lai and Qiu (2003) and Cai and Li (2011) . Nevertheless, little or no attention has been paid in the above-mentioned literature to the implementation of the agreed-upon level of IPRs in the South and how this varies with the level of development of the Southern country.
We endogenize the choice of cross-border IP protection in the context of negotiations. Vishwasrao (1994) , Zigic (1998 Zigic ( , 2000 , Yang and Maskus (2001) , Glass and Saggi (2002), Grossman and Lai (2004) , Mukherjee and Pennings (2004) , Connolly and Valderrama (2005) , Naghavi (2007) , Mukherjee and Ray (2007) , and Leahy and Naghavi (2010) .
A Nash bargaining game is applied as a solution concept to study the interactions between the North and the South. We show the mutually agreed stringency of IPR obligations relates positively to the absorptive capacity in the South. We then show that the implementation of a cross-border IPR contract in the South depends on the country-specific characteristics in terms of how technologically advanced the country is. Namely, a larger transfer along with looser IPR protection in less advanced countries bring about an improvement in global efficiency. This works in line with the special and differential treatment provided to least developed countries by article 66 of TRIPS, which highlights the transitional arrangements to implement all the provisions of the agreement and encourage technology transfer.
In accordance with recent evidence, our simple model explicitly separates the contracting stage of TRIPS from the post-agreement enforcement period. Our findings suggest that the incentives to deviate from the contract increases with the absorptive capability of the southern signatory. More specifically, information on such violation is revealed from the active involvement of the North in safeguarding its domestic firms' business interests within a broader context of international negotiations to assure compliance by their counterpart. The opportunity cost of a positive reaction by the southern party is higher, the more advanced is the country. We thus observe that disputes between the North and less developed nations are more likely to be resolved than those with the fast-growing newly emerging economies.
The analysis in the present paper offers policy recommendation by showing that an active participation by the northern government in the IP enforcement in the South can only facilitate better implementation of a cross-border IPR contract when the absorptive capacity of its counterpart is not too high. This supports calls for more direct incentive-oriented interventions that aim to improve the legal infrastructure to facilitate the resolution of IPR issues in the relatively more advanced emerging economies. These steps can include the promotion of technology transfer or aid packages that aim to improve the legal infrastructure in the South.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives a background on TRIPS and the contemporaneous "Special 301" unilateral actions by the U.S., followed by stylized facts that motivate our study. In section 3, we set up the basic model and solve for the benchmark case of a cooperative Nash bargaining game to endogenously determine the optimal IP protection level and the equilibrium transfer payment. Section 4 discusses the post-contract stage to study the enforcement of the IPR agreement and explain how this directly depends on the southern country's absorptive capacity.
Section 5 concludes.
TRIPS Enforcement, Special 301, and Emerging Economies
The U.S. is a major producer and exporter of copyrighted materials as well as high 4 See Bhagwati and Patrick (1990) for the viewpoint of developing countries on Special 301 and how such unilateral action can be accused of impeding TRIPS by using access to the U.S. markets as a lever. 
The Cross-border Intellectual Property Protection Contract

The Basics
We construct a basic model with two countries, North and South. IPR protection is assumed to be complete in the North, while the level in the South is to be determined by means of a contract reached through cooperative Nash bargaining between the two governments. Two firms, an innovator from the North (denoted by firm n) and one imitator from the South (denoted by firm m), produce a homogeneous goods and compete in the output market. To simplify the analysis, we focus on the southern market by assuming segmented markets so that losses from infringement in the South do not spillover to the northern market. 7 The firms face an inverse demand function in the South of
where A denotes the size of the market, and Y is the aggregate of the outputs of firm n ( n y ) and firm m ( m y ).
We start from a situation, where firm n has undertaken an initial (sunk) investment to bring the product into the market. As we are concerned with issues related to copyrights, we have in mind goods such as business and entertainment software, or music records and motion pictures. After the initial invention takes place, the marginal cost of reproduction is assumed to be zero ( 0 = The payoffs to the two firms are their profits
for i=n,m, whereas consumer surplus in the South is
Southern welfare adds up to
We begin our analysis by first deriving the equilibrium output levels in the market stage. We then use this to derive the outcome of the contract, which contains the equilibrium IPR protection level in the South. Starting with the second stage Cournot competition yields an output by each firm of 
which in turn result in profits
Southern consumer surplus can then be derived and is
The bargaining game
We now look at the first stage, where the value of β is endogenously determined through negotiations. More precisely, we envisage two governments, n G and m G , representing the innovating firm n and the South, respectively. 11 If an agreement is reached, the payoffs to the governments are given by
With the value of β interpreted as a copyright parameter, this setting characterizes the situation, where n G makes a reciprocal compensation, ) ( protection for foreign IP so that firm n's product can be freely copied and reproduced.
The Nash bargaining solution (NBS henceforth) is used to characterize the bargaining outcome. In the NBS, the negotiated outcome, ) , (
, is the solution to:
where ( )( )
is the Nash product, and ) , ( This allows us to analyze the most basic setup with zero outside option for both parties. Under our assumption of segmented markets, this simply states that the northern firm does not serve the Southern market upon failure of an agreement, while retaining its profits elsewhere. This also blocks the southern firm's access to the production technology, preventing it from entering the market. The next section will look into the possibility of a positive outside option for the Southern firm subsequent to the agreement and therefore after gaining access to the production technology.
We now solve Equation (10) using (5)- (9) 
Proof: See Appendix.
Notice that the smaller root in Equation (11) leads to a minimum solution of Nash product. We therefore replace the larger root, which ensures that the SOC are satisfied, back into in Equation (9) 
T
The comparison is performed in the Appendix and confirm that the IPR regime from (11) and (12) indeed maximizes the Nash bargaining problem except for very high levels of absorptive capacity 1 ≈ ζ , in which case β=0 is the optimal solution. This result has important implications suggesting that strong cross-border IPR protection is optimal if the reference country has reached the later stages of development to absorb and make use of transfers from the North. For this to be true, IPR protection must be accompanied by rather large transfers from the North as a form of compensation.
Yet, the evidence from Section 2 illustrated that the most developed emerging 12 It is worth noting that our results differ from the outcome obtained in Cai and Li (2011) , in which bargaining led to two corner solutions. In particular, the southern government's value for a quid pro quo payment changed its objective function from maximizing domestic social welfare (no IPR protection) to maximizing joint benefits (full IPR protection). economies are reluctant in enforcing the agreed IPR regulation. We must therefore also consider the case of
, which is a corner solution for * β when T=0
and is further dealt with in Section 4 as a no agreement case with zero transfer and no IPR protection.
Post-agreement Monitoring and the Enforcement of IPRs
Post-TRIPS execution efforts
We now move to the post-agreement phase with all WTO members committed to an international level of IPR protection through TRIPS. Nevertheless, there remains concerns that some governments initially conform to international IP regulations to attract northern firms, yet fail to perform once foreign investments are already in place (Markusen, 2001) . We therefore differentiate the negotiations leading up to the signing of the treaty from the dynamics of bargaining that determine implementation in its aftermath.
It is worth emphasizing that we use a wider concept of bargaining less common in literature due to the divorce of compliance from bargaining, that includes for example explicit threats of sanction even after the conclusion of successful negotiations. Jonsson and Tallberg (1998) In the presence of monitoring and enforcement, the two governments can only reach the previously agreed level of IPR protection subject to individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints. Individual rationality requires the payoff to the North and the South to be strictly positive. Incentive compatibility implies that the payoff to the two governments are higher with monitoring and enforcement than they would be if the treaty is neglected. More precisely, recall that in the case of noncompliance, IPRs are not protected in the South ( 1 = β ).
14 Therefore, incentive compatibility requires conditions
to hold. Note that transfers are sunk as they are already made after the conclusion of 
Absorptive capacity and compliance
We next examine the second-best enforcement mechanism necessary for the South to fulfill its IPR commitment. Monitoring by n G serves as a form of threat to induce the enforcement of * β in the South. The North carries out cross-border 13 We simply model this as a lump-sum cost to the South, while in a broader context it can be thought of as a punitive tariff or denial of market access.
14 Recall that both southern profits and consumer surplus are increasing in β at all times.
inspection of its IP interests, and the absorptive capacity of a southern country is the main determinant of the resulting IPR enforcement.
Looking back at welfare in Equation (14) Proof: Follows directly from (9) and (14).
Proposition 2 states that the incentive compatibility constraint of countries with higher absorptive capacities are harder to satisfy. This implies that a country with higher absorptive capacity can better exploit a lax IPR regime. In other words, the opportunity cost of IPR protection in the South is higher the more advanced is the economy. The Proposition offers an explanation as to why countries at a later stage of development are more reluctant in accepting internationally recognized IP laws regardless of additional monitoring measures. Figure 4 illustrates, for a given λ , the threshold level of absorptive capacity above which the South does not comply to TRIPS. The positive slope of λ highlights that the argument in Lall (2003) , that incentives to protect patents increase 15 The expression has been written in terms of T* from Equation (12) for the sake of exposition.
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as a country develops and builds its own base for innovation, does not necessary hold when dealing with copyright protection.
Concluding Remarks
Data on the IPR protection has brought growing doubts about the actual enforcement of the TRIPS agreement, especially in some of the more advanced newly emerging economies. Our study distinguishes TRIPS (the negotiation and its outcome), here treated as a cross-border IPR contract by means of Nash bargaining, from its actual enforcement by the signatories. We introduce the North-South IPR treaty as an outcome of a bargaining process in a cross-border IP protection contract.
The findings demonstrate how the optimal IPR protection level obtained through cooperative Nash bargaining varies with the absorptive capacity of a country, reflecting concessions granted to least developing nations in terms of a transition period to adapt to the global set of standards.
The analysis further shows that the implementation of a cross-border IPR contract in the South depends on country-specific characteristics and is more likely to occur for less technologically advanced southern countries. In particular, it provides an explanation why some developing countries do not appear on the Special 301 watch list, or others manage to promptly settle copyright disputes with the U.S.
Likewise, it rationalizes why issues with countries that are endowed with better absorptive capacities tend to remain unresolved regardless of the use of Special 301 as a monitoring device. This is in line with evidence showing that the emerging economies with fast episodes of growth in recent years such as China, Russia, and India, are those that are associated with substantial trade losses due to copyright piracy, and precisely the countries that are continuously posted in the USTR priority watch list for inadequate IPR enforcement. Our explanation for this stylized fact suggests that these set of countries face a higher opportunity cost of enforcement. They thus find it more favorable to neglect their TRIPS obligation after the agreement phase, in a period when they enjoy high rates of growth. Moreover, threats that arise from monitoring activities are not sufficient for the fulfillment of TRIPS in countries with high absorptive capacities. Other forms of incentive-creating mechanisms besides measures that create a cost for the South may be called for to encourage the implementation of TRIPS in the fast-growing emerging economies. 
